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This paper utilises survey data of return migrants to analyse the determinants of remittances 
sent while the migrants were abroad. We approach our research question from the perspective 
of three sending countries in the Maghreb, namely Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. We 
investigate the remittance behaviour using the migrantsÕ conditions before migration as well 
as during the migration experience. Using a two-part model, we show that the decision to 
remit and the amount remitted depend on a combination of different migrant characteristics 
and reasons for migration as well as the duration and form of migration. More importantly, 
we also consider if the remittance behaviour is dependent on the type of return: ÔdecidedÕ or 
ÔcompelledÕ. We show that the two groups have different incentives to remit which can help 
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The economic implications of migration for sending and receiving countries vary 
widely. Receiving countries may experience an infusion of cheap labour into the economy 
with consequent impacts on wage and job availability. For sending countries, emigration 
seems to have even a larger impact. On the one hand, home countries may suffer from Òbrain 
drainÓ while on the other hand, benefits of emigration may be identified via unemployment 
alleviation, human capital accumulation (as a result of return migration), and, arguably most 
importantly, the inflow of remittances.  
Recent data reveals that remittance flows to developing countries have more than 
tripled over the past decade. Following a fall to $305 billion in 2009, the World Bank 
estimates that remittances reached a little over $400 billion in 2012, and are expected to reach  
$479 billion by 2017.1 Furthermore, the World Bank underlines that the volume of these 
private transfers could possibly be at least 50 percent more than what the available data 
suggests. 
 Understanding the conditions that affect the remittance pattern of migrants is 
important to contextualise the net benefits of migration. The motivations that generate these 
flows of income may vary from supporting the family at home to buying a property or 
realizing other investment projects.2 Moreover, in the case of temporary migration, 
remittances may generate entrepreneurial opportunities upon return and help overcome the 
credit constraints that individuals may face in the origin country.  
The growing importance of these income transfers has produced numerous studies, 
which have not only investigated the impact of remittances on growth and development in the 
origin countries but also the possible motivations to remit. Nevertheless, there is still no 
consensus as to what motivates migrants to remit, especially when migration can take 
different forms (e.g. temporary, permanent, circular). For instance, there might be a reduction 
in the remittance flows of those who intend to stay in the destination country permanently as 
their family moves with them or joins them in the destination country and as the links with 
the home country diminish over time. However, if the motive to remit is to secure a share in 
future bequest by the parent then these flows can last for a very long time (Lucas and Stark 





2 Remittances may also represent an additional income source used to alleviate family poverty, to finance 




1985, Hoddinott 1994, de la Brire et al. 2002). Nevertheless, migrants who intend to return 
to the home country are more likely to remit regularly, and possibly for different objectives 
than those who migrate permanently.3 Dustmann and Mestres (2010), for example, argue that 
temporary migrants are likely to remit more as their family members stay in the home 
country instead of joining them in the destination country. In addition, remittances may be 
affected by the insurance motive as temporary migrants consider the readjustment cost upon 
return and seek (extended) family assistance in this regard. Finally, they find that the more 
likely a migrant is to return, the higher the probability of remitting for investment purposes. 
Most papers that discuss temporary migration do so using intentions to return as a 
proof of actual return. However, intentions do not necessarily convert into actions and only if 
migrants have actually returned to the home country is it reasonable to argue that their 
remittances while in the destination country were based on their ÔtrueÕ intentions, at that time, 
to return (see Lu, 1999).4 Accordingly, our analysis in this paper focuses on return migrants 
and considers how different individual and household characteristics as well as different 
forms of temporary migration − return after only one migration episode versus circular 
migration − affect the remittance behaviour of return-migrants, while they were still living 
abroad. In addition, because of the interesting nature of the data set, we are able to highlight 
differences in remitting behaviour by type of return: ÔdecidedÕ or ÔcompelledÕ. Migrants who 
decide or choose to return home may exhibit different remittance behaviour to those who 
were forced to interrupt the migration experience. We investigate if any significant 
differences between the two groups of returnees exist in the determinants of remittances. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a cross-sectional dataset collected in 2006/2007 in 
the context of the Migration de Retour au Maghreb (MIREM) project. This unique data set 
provides a rich source of information concerning migrant behaviour for three Maghreb 
countries: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. These have traditionally been migrant sending 
countries with a long history of out migration and high remittance flows,5 and yet there is 
limited research on this region within the migration literature. To our knowledge, this paper is 
the first empirical study on remittance motivations using this dataset, which, despite its 
                                                
3 See Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for a review of the theoretical literature regarding the motivations for 
remittances. 
4 One downside of using a dataset that is based on remittance behaviour of migrants who have already returned 
to the home country is that it can generate recall bias. As some migrants might have returned some time ago, 
they may not recall their remittance behaviour prior to returning to the country of origin. We acknowledge the 
shortcoming but believe that this kind of data could still provide some interesting insights into the remittance 
behaviour of return migrants. 
5 In 2010, for instance, Moroccan remittances were estimated to be around $6.4 billion and around $2.0 billion 
for each of Algeria and Tunisia (World Bank, 2011). 
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shortcomings, provides valuable insight into the remittance behaviour of return migrants 
while they were still abroad. 
One of the key shortcomings of the MIREM data is that the sample suffers from 
selection issues as it is not representative of the migrant population. However, it contains 
important information discussed above and therefore the analysis could contribute to the 
literature on the determinants of remittances from the perspective of those who have actually 
returned to the home country. Return migrants are very important in promoting development 
through remittances, norms, social practices and ideas about management, skills and access to 
capital (Anghel et al., 2015). To our knowledge, no other data set on remittance behaviour 
uses information from the actual returnees. 
  Our strategy consists in separating the probability (extensive margin) and the level 
(intensive margin) of remittances. Our results show that the differences in remittances among 
different return migrants to the Maghreb region can be explained by a combination of 
household and migrant observed characteristics. Furthermore, we find that some important 
factors which affect the decision to remit do not explain the amount remitted and vice versa. 
For example, education and labour force status affect the probability to remit but they are not 
significant in explaining the amount remitted. Also, entering illegally in the host country  ̶  
the type of information not available in most of the datasets  ̶   positively affects the level of 
remittances. Since in our setup the return is actually realised, those interviewed state their 
legal/illegal status in the host country, as it is a retrospective question.  In regards to the type 
of return, we find that some household and individual characteristics affect the remittance 
behaviour of decided and compelled returnees in different ways.  We provide some intuition 
for our results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes how 
migration has evolved in the Maghreb region. Section 3 provides a description of the data set 
used in the paper. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, discuss the empirical methodology and 
estimation results. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Migration Trend and Remittance Flows in the Maghreb  
Western Europe represents the main destination region of the Maghreb migration 
flows followed by the oil producing Arab countries. For historical reasons, France has 
attracted the majority of the Maghreb community abroad, followed by Spain and Italy. The 
OECD reports that France received a flow of 22,315 Algerians, 19,214 Moroccans and 7,854 
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Tunisians in 2008 while Spain received a higher flow of migrants from Morocco (93,623) in 
the same period.6 
Since the post-colonial period, migration in the Euro-Mediterranean region has been 
characterized by different phases depending on historical and political events, both at the 
national and international level. Following a period of guest-worker programmes (1963-
1972) signed between the Maghreb and some European countries (France, Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands), the 1973 Oil Crisis and subsequent economic recession in 
Western Europe represent a turning point for Maghreb-European Migration, marking the end 
of the recruitment phase in Europe and the beginning of restrictive migration policies that 
continue to persist today. Notwithstanding these restrictive policies, two key events that 
characterised yet another phase of migration flows from the region to Europe were the first 
Gulf War of 1991 and the air and arms embargo imposed on Libya between 1992 and 2000. 
The flow of emigrants from North Africa has increased in the last 10 years, with continued 
labour force growth (2.8 percent a year for the region)7 and high unemployment in the 
presence of limited labour demand playing their part as the main push factors.8 
In general, poverty, unemployment and political instability in the region can be 
identified as the main causes of the decision to emigrate. Migration of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers with rural origin has dominated the flow to Europe. However, skilled 
emigrants from North Africa have grown significantly over the past two decades. Information 
regarding the total number of expatriates, as well as the proportion of high-skilled provided 
by origin countries, do not always correspond to the statistics available in the receiving 
countries.9 More recently, Docquier et al. (2009) have developed a dataset that highlights 
worldwide migrantsÕ skill levels in the OECD.10 Looking at the skilled migration rate of the 
Maghreb region in 2000, Morocco has almost 20 percent of its skilled workforce living 
abroad, Tunisia around 13 percent and Algeria almost 10 percent.11 It is not clear if this 
                                                
6 Inflows of foreign population are derived from population registers or residence permit data. Illegal migration 
is not taken into account and therefore the information provided from the OECD International Migration Dataset 
gives us only a partial view. 
7 Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Egypt. 
8An updated dataset on immigrants in the OECD and non-OECD countries has been recently made publicly 
available in the OECD website 
(http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3746,en%202649%2037415%2046561249%201%201%201%203741%20
5,00.html). 
9 It may depend on the choice of different criteria of computation and it requires a consistent effort to harmonize 
data between sending and receiving countries 
10 The dataset is based on the aggregation of harmonized immigration data collected in OECD host countries for 
two periods, 1990 and 2000. Only individuals of age 25+ are considered as at that age education is assumed to 
be completed. 




phenomenon reflects a change in migration selectivity or is simply the consequence of a 
general improvement in the level of education in origin countries. The World Bank (2010) 
highlights that the reasons behind the departure of educated individuals do not depend solely 
on wage differentials between Maghreb and Europe. Labour market conditions including 
unemployment, industry structure and a lack of career opportunities for the highly skilled are 
also considered to be important elements that affect the migration decision. 
The migrant profiles from North Africa have also changed with respect to the gender 
composition. Before the 1980s, migrants were almost exclusively male and single. The 
scenario that appears today sees increasing labour market participation among migrant 
women. Initially, women migrated in the context of family reunification but they have gained 
an active role in the foreign labour market, which seems to be related to the improvement in 
education of women and the increase in demand in the domestic help sector in Europe (as 
cleaners and nannies). Just to give an example, between 30 and 50 percent of active 
Moroccan migrants in Europe are females Ð a 45 percent increase over the last two decades 
(The World Bank, 2005). 
Finally, although for obvious reasons there are no official records on undocumented 
migration, the proportion of migrant workers crossing illegally into the EU has increased in 
the last two decades.12 Illegal labour migrants are those individuals who do not fulfil the legal 
conditions of entry, stay and employment; they respond to an informal demand for labour.  
North African population movements have generated a consistent flow of transfers to 
origin countries. The entire MENA region receives 10 percent of the worldÕs remittances with 
North Africa accounting for a large proportion. Indeed, remittances in this region surpass 
other financial flows such as FDI. For example, remittances to Morocco accounted for 9 
percent of the share of GDP in 2007. Remittances to Algeria and Tunisia constitute a much 
smaller share of GDP (2.1% and 1.7% in 2007) though such flows remain higher than both 
ODA and FDI.13 More recently, remittance flows to the Maghreb have been affected by the 
global financial crisis Ð the World Bank (2010) reports that remittances may have declined by 
10 percent between 2008 and 2009. Given that on a per capita basis, as well as a share of 
GDP, dependence on remittances in North Africa is greater than any other region in the 
world, and the impact of this decline may be significant. Nevertheless, remittance flows are 
forecast to increase again in the coming years. 
 
                                                
12   Thematic Session: Irregular Migration into and through Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, 
available at: http//www.carim.org/index.php?areaid=15&contented=222. 
13 World Development Indicators (2009). 
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3. Data  
The dataset used in this paper is extracted from the survey carried out by the MIREM 
project on return migrants to three countries in the Maghreb region, namely Algeria, Tunisia 
and Morocco.14 The survey design and sampling methods followed a thorough inventory of 
the existing statistical and documentary data related to return migration in these 
countries.  The distribution of sample responses across regions and by gender were verified 
and compared with the official census data to ensure the sample was representative.15 
Estimates on the number of return migrants in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, computed from 
census data, are available on the website of the MIREM project.16  
Return migrants are defined as Òany person returning to his/her country of origin, in 
the course of the last ten years, having been an international migrant (whether short-term or 
long-term) in another country. Return may be permanent or temporary. It may be 
independently decided by the migrant or forced by unexpected circumstancesÓ. Given the 
restricted geographical coverage of the survey and the focus on return migrants only, 
observed trends in the data may not be considered as evidence of wider national trends in the 
return migration cycle. Nonetheless, the data provide a unique opportunity to consider the 
microeconomic behaviour of return migrants across the Maghreb region. 
The main objective of the MIREM project was to provide a better understanding of 
the challenges linked to return migration (as the reintegration path) and its impact on 
economic development. These outcomes were achieved by utilising questionnaire responses 
that identify migrant profiles at three different migratory stages: pre-migration conditions in 
the country of origin; migrant experiences in the country of immigration; and finally their 
conditions in the home country after return. Capturing such information enables the 
identification of those factors inherent in understanding the migration cycle. Importantly, it 
also enables us to distinguish between those migrants who chose to return home and those 
who were compelled or forced to return due to unexpected circumstances. 
The MIREM survey is composed of 992 return migrants with approximately 330 
individuals in each country interviewed between September 2006 and January 2007 using a 
common questionnaire (see Table 1).17 Because of missing information for some of the 
relevant variables used in our analysis, our final sample consists of 845 observations. This 
                                                
14 The ÒCollective Action to Support the Reintegration of Return Migrants in their Country of OriginÓ, MIREM 




17 See http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/research-projects/mirem/survey-on-return-migrants/methodology  
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sample includes students, housewives and retirees since a small percentage of such 
respondents were observed to engage in remittance behaviour.18 As discussed, the survey 
provides a rich source of information regarding migrant conditions prior to migration as well 
as various aspects of migrantsÕ experiences (employment status, education and training 
received, legal or illegal status etc.) abroad and upon their return home. The survey also 
provides information regarding both the frequency and level of remittances.  
Table 2 reveals that approximately 69 percent of all return migrants in the sample sent 
remittances regularly or at least ÒoccasionallyÓ (less than once a year) to their home country. 
The majority of remitters sent transfers monthly, though notable differences exist among the 
three countries: 31.4% and 26.1% respectively to Tunisia and Morocco compared to 4.3% in 
the case of Algeria. Algerian returnees report the highest percentage in the category of no-
transfers (45.5%).  
Table 3 shows the amount of remittances sent to the origin country by the migrant 
during the last year of their migration experience. The amount of remittances is in nominal 
terms and there is no control for inflation. However, the majority of migrants returned home 
after 2000. The earliest return was in 1996. Moreover, remittances are reported in euros and 
the euro has been quite stable with low inflation until recently. 
Of those who remitted, around 67 percent reported transferring money to family 
members in the home country. Supporting the family for survival reasons is stated as the 
main purpose for sending remittances (87% of those who remitted). Financing childrenÕs 
education is also reported as being important.  
The selected sample is predominantly male (88%) with a mean age of 26 years at the 
time of departure. Before migration, 26% were living in a rural location, 29% were married 
and 23% had children. Since family status is an important element in determining the 
remittance decision, we have constructed a variable to account for those who married at home 
and did not change status while abroad, as well as those who married in the destination 
country. The latter group constitute 32% of the sample. The survey asks explicitly whether 
the original migration decision was intended to be temporary or permanent. The intended 
form of migration is relevant for understanding remittance behaviour as temporary migrants 
are more likely to remit than those who migrate for long term. Approximately 27% of sample 
respondents stated that they intended to migrate on a permanent basis whilst  46% intended to 
                                                
18 While it is not clear how some individuals in the inactive category are able to remit, it is possible to make 
explain such behaviour. For instance, for retirees it is possible to argue that they were remitting from their 
retirement allowance or from non-wage income. For students and housewives, the source of their transfers may 




return home. The remaining respondents did not know their intention at the time of migration.  
Economic reasons dominate the migration decision: More than half of the sample (67%) 
migrated to look for a better job or, more generally, to improve life conditions. Summary 
statistics are reported in Table 4. 
Survey information regarding migrantsÕ level of education is provided both before 
and during the migration experience. Most return-migrants were relatively well educated 
prior to migration with 38% having completed secondary school certificate and a further 26% 
having completed tertiary education. Approximately 15% of respondents reported having no 
qualification at the time of migration. Conversely, 24% obtained additional qualifications in 
the host country, thereby improving their level of education whilst abroad. To capture these 
dynamics, we construct a variable reporting the last level of education before return, taking 
into account the level of education before migration for those who did not study in the host 
country as well as the ÒnewÓ qualification obtained for those who did. It is important to 
observe that the proportion of return migrants who studied abroad was higher for those who 
were relatively more educated prior to migration, i.e., those relatively better educated before 
migration were more likely to invest in education while abroad. We also found an inverse 
relationship between educational attainment and the duration of migration. On average, we 
observe a negative correlation between the level of education and the period of time spent 
abroad (see Figure 1).  
A potential weakness of the MIREM survey is that it has no direct information 
regarding household income level or individualsÕ earnings, which, of course, would help us to 
understand better the remittances behaviour/motivation. To overcome this limitation, we 
consider an indirect measure to evaluate individualsÕ financial status. We use information in 
the survey questionnaire regarding their subjective financial situation in the country of origin, 
before migration. This is captured using three levels: good, satisfactory and bad.19 Using this 
measure, approximately 61% of the sampled individuals declare themselves to be in at least 
ÔsatisfactoryÕ financial situation before migration, suggesting that remittances may not be sent 
to provide for the basic consumption needs of the left-behind household members.  
 Furthermore, given that the MIREM survey has no direct information regarding 
migrant earnings, which is, of course, an essential condition of remitting, we use the 
migrantÕs labour force status and an indicator variable for whether the financial situation 
                                                
19 Another possibility would be to consider the type and number of goods they owned before migration. We 
decided to exclude this possibility firstly because we have only very general information on the types of goods 
and secondly because it is not clear if these goods belong to the migrant or to the household as a whole. It is also 
possible that young migrants declare not to have any goods even if they come from wealthy families. 
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abroad has improved or not.20 One of the main contributions of the MIREM database is that it 
provides information on the labour force status of migrants at various points of the migration 
cycle. In our analysis of remittance behaviour, we focus solely on the last activity in the host 
country. This is primarily because the question capturing the decision to remit refers to the 
last period of the migration experience and we do not have any information on the exact time 
migrants start to remit. We assume that the remittance behaviour before returning home is 
partially determined by the most recent activity in the host country  
The survey groups labour market activities into 12 professional categories. We 
aggregate across these groups and reclassify migrants into one of four labour market states: 
inactive, unemployed, wage earners and self-employed. The distribution of these labour 
market states is reported in Figures 2 and 3. The wage earner category includes individuals 
with indefinite contracts, fixed term contracts, part-time and seasonal workers; and represents 
64.7 percent of the selected sample. The self-employed account for 16.6 percent of the 
sample and includes business owners employing at least one person, legal or illegal  
independent workers, and those individuals who report themselves as family workers.21 The 
inactive and unemployed account for 18.7 percent of the sample.22  
Some of the returnees (18%) in the sample report migrating more than once, either to 
the same or a different host country. Accordingly, we classify these respondents as circular 
migrants. France is the primary destination country for the migrants in our sample, perhaps 
reflecting past colonization and/or the influence of French institutions and governance 
following independence. Italy is the second largest destination, most probably because of 
geographic proximity. We aggregate the destination countries into 6 groups: France; Italy; 
other South EU; other EU; MENA region; rest of the World. Ideally, we would control for 
unobservable characteristics of the destination countries by introducing a dummy for each 
country. However, this is not possible because we have a small sample for each of the 36 
different destination countries (just 1 or 2 observations in some cases). 
Overall, 14% of our sample entered their destination country illegally with Moroccans 
leading the group (31%) followed by Tunisians (10%) and Algerians (4%). The legal/illegal 
status is constructed from a specific question relating to the conditions under which the 
migrant entered the host country. Illegal status is defined as entering without legal 
                                                
20 The financial situation did not improve for only 17% of the sample. 
21 It may argue that family workers should be considered in the wage earner category. Based on the special link 
that characterises relationships in a family we conclude that the interest of the worker coincides with of the 
family, therefore the decision to include them in the self-employed category.  
22 The unemployed are part of the workforce and therefore need to be separated from the inactive category 
composed of students, housewives and retired. 
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documentation, using false document or violating the terms of visa entry (e.g., working on a 
tourist visa or overstaying).   
Most of the migrants, during their time abroad, declared to be regularly in touch with 
their family members at home through telephone, letters and e-mails, and for 57% of them 
family had been the main source of information in the returning process. Furthermore, a 
significant proportion (31.7%) of return migrants has invested in at least one project upon 
return. This suggests that migration could be interpreted as a strategy to alleviate credit 
market imperfections and invest in a project on return using past remittance transfers and 
possibly savings accumulated abroad (see Mesnard, 2004; Piracha and Vadean, 2010).23 We 
hypothesize that there is a positive link between the amounts of remittances sent home and 
the investment decision upon return. Overall, 32% of return migrants invested in a project in 
the country of origin. The descriptive statistics by country of origin show that those who 
invest more upon return are migrants from Tunisia (42%) while those from Algeria invest 
much less (17%), which indicates investment from remittances combine with the local 
investment environment. Finally, individuals evaluate positively the experience abroad: 
79.5% of the interviewees claimed to have taken advantage from the experience overseas and 
38% of the return migrants think to repeat the migration experience. 
 
4. Analytical and empirical framework 
The analysis of remittance behaviour needs to be collocated within the utility 











     (1) 
 
where Ui is the utility function, ci, ri and yi are, respectively, the migrantÕs consumption, 
remittances and income while ! is the fixed cost of sending remittances and I(.) is the 
indicator function. 
It is possible to assume that for each migrant the marginal utility of consumption is 
strictly positive 0>c
i
U , while the marginal utility with respect to remittances is 0³r
i
U
indicating that for some individuals the optimal amount of remittances might be zero. In fact, 
if τ > 0, by continuity we have that limriЍ0, U(ci, ri) < U(ci, 0); i.e., it means that when sending 
                                                
23 We unfortunately do not have information on retained savings brought back home by the return migrants. The 
remittance data in MIREM may or may not include it. 
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money home is costly, there is a minimum amount of remittances 
-
r under which the 
additional utility that the migrant derives from remitting is lower than the utility of not 
remitting.	 
 Zero remittances can occur because (i) migrantÕs income is too low and/or transfer 






(ii) the migrant does not attach any utility to remittances ( 0=r
i
U ). Given that 
-
r  is probably 
partially individual-specific, it is quite challenging to quantify it exactly. Moreover, transfer 
costs depend on the remittance destination and it is very difficult to take non-monetary costs 
into account. However, as discussed by Bettin et al. 2012, it is reasonable to assume that 
-
r
and τ are of the same order and magnitude. 
In modelling the determinants of the migrantsÕ transfers, it is important to consider the 
nature of the dependent variable. If the decision to remit and the amount remitted are 
governed by the same mechanism and zero remittances are only caused by a budget 
constraint then the appropriate approach is to consider censored regression models such as 
Tobit.24 This model postulates a latent remittance outcome for nonparticipants (i.e. those who 
do not remit) whereby the associated log-likelihood function consists of two parts: one that 
corresponds to the classical regression for the uncensored observations, and another that 
corresponds to the relevant probabilities that an observation is censored. 
In the current context, the above approach has two main drawbacks. First, the model 
is only applicable where zero values are due to non-observability, that is, the data capture true 
censoring. This may not be the case since observed zeroes could represent the decisions of 
individuals not to remit. Second, the model is restrictive in that it assumes the same 
mechanism underlies both the intensive and extensive margins. However, it is highly likely 
that the decision to remit may depend on factors other than those that determine the level of 
remittances. Accordingly, an alternative framework allows to separate the decision to remit 
from the amount of remittances. If we then assume that migrants who gain utility from 
remittances always remit, then zero remittances only occur if migrants do not attach any 
utility to remittances. The Heckman selection model, based on the idea that migrants who 
choose to remit are a self-selected group and therefore estimations of the level of remittances 
need to be corrected for the selection bias they contain, would be the appropriate approach. 
                                                
24 The Tobit model cannot be implemented in our specific case because the amount of remittances is not 
observed in a continuous form. We use the interval regression approach and we show the results in the appendix 
in Table A1. An alternative estimation strategy is to use an ordered probit where the first ordinal outcome is 
ri=0 if ri*≤ 0. 
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However, if we assume that the observed zeroes can be generated from two different 
processes: behavioural zeroes (non-participation) and random zeroes (participation but no 
remittances), the approach to follow is the double hurdle model or simple two-part model. It 
permits different mechanisms to generate the alternative and can be expressed as:  
                                                       
























d     (2) 
 
Remittance level:   ( )
iiii
vxdr +=> 2
'* 0| b      (3) 
 
Equation (3) represents the remittance decision of return migrants.  The variable *
i
d  is 
a latent variable that determines the discrete outcome
i
d , the decision to remit. The discrete 
outcome is observed with 1=
i
d  if 0* >
i
d  and 0=
i
d if 0* £
i
d . The '
i
z is a vector of non-
stochastic regressors and β1 is a vector of unknown parameters. Assuming the errors, ie , are 
standard normal, consistent estimates of β1 can be obtained using maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE). 
Equation (3) represents the remittance level  conditional on the decision to remit, 
where  is a continuous non-negative random variable bounded at zero. Again, '
i
x  is a 
vector of regressors that may include those contained in '
i
z  or additional ones.  The errors 
i
v  
are again considered to be independent normal.25  
Remittances in the MIREM data are reported as interval data ranging from less than 
€200 to more than €1000. Interval data presents a problem when utilised as a dependent 
variable. Assigning the midpoint to observations in any given group is one possible method 
to deal with this type of data (Bettin et al., 2012). However, taking midpoints of the intervals 
introduce measurement error bias and allocating values to open-ended groups is an ad hoc 
procedure that is known not to produce consistent parameter estimates.26 Accordingly, we 
adopt an alternative strategy and utilise the approach of Stewart (1983), which recognises that 
                                                
25 The two step selection model, or simply Heckman model, assumes dependence between the two error terms 
(εi, νi). The correction of any bias that might be present due to selectivity issues sees the introduction of a second 
latent variable (instrumental variable) in the first step equation from which is calculated the Mills ratio: 
ɸ(β1zi)/!(β1zi). This ratio is used as an additional regressor in the second step equation to correct for selectivity. 
26 The analysis would not reflect the uncertain nature of the exact value within each interval nor would it deal 







the upper and lower bounds of observed intervals provide important information for the 
consistent estimation of an econometric model. 
 We assume that the errors,
i
v , in Equation 3, are independently identically normally 
distributed random variables with zero mean and variance σ2. This yields the distribution of 
the unobserved dependent variable as: 
 
),(~ 22 sbii xNr           (4) 
 
The dependent variable is observed to fall into a certain range on the real line. Let Rk-1 and Rk 
be the lower and upper boundaries of the kth range 
 
Rk-1 < ri ≤ Rk           (5) 
In our data, the lower bound of remittances is closed at zero and the upper one is open 
ended. In logarithmic form both extreme ranges are open ended such that R0 = - ∞ and Rk = + 
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where Φ( ) is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal. Consistent estimates of β2 
and σ are obtained by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The sign of the regression 
parameters β2 can be interpreted as determining whether or not the level of remittances 
increases with the regressor. 
 
5. Results 
The advantage of the two-part model is that it allows the determinants of the 
probability and the level of remittances to be investigated separately under the assumption 
that these two decisions are generated by different probability mechanisms. We have found 
that the amount remitted is affected by variables that do not impact the probability to remit. 
We would not be able to arrive at the same conclusion if we assumed a joint mechanism as in 
the case of the Tobit model or related models discussed earlier. In the discussion that follows 
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we explain results from the two-part model; the results for Heckman model are presented in 
Table A2 in the Appendix but not discussed here.27 
 
5.1 The decision to remit and the amount remitted 
The results of the two-part model are reported in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report, 
respectively, the marginal effects of a simple probit model on the decision to remit and the 
results for the interval regression on the determinants of the amount transferred conditional 
on the decision to remit. The results reveal that gender has no impact on the decision to remit 
but female migrants transfer significantly less than their male counterparts. The finding that 
women remit less than men is widely observed in studies on remittances. This may reflect 
gender disparities in the labour market  relating to both opportunities and earnings , but may 
also indicate a strong patriarchal nature of society in many developing countries. Although 
we  control for gender in our empirical strategy, we are not able to control for the relationship 
of the migrant with the head of the household at the time of migration. This additional 
information might provide further insight into the remittance behaviour of returning 
migrants.. Unfortunately, the survey does not provide such information.  
We find clear origin country effects with migrants from Morocco and Tunisia being 
19% more likely to remit than those from Algeria. A similar finding is reported by Miotti et 
al. (2010) who investigate the remittance behaviour in the Southern Mediterranean countries 
from the perspective of a receiving country, France. This may suggest that, independently 
                                                
27 Note that the two-part model attains its flexibility by assuming that the two parts Ð the decision to remit and 
the amount remitted Ð are independent. If we permit the possibility of dependence between the disturbance 
terms then a Heckman Sample Selection Model may be more appropriate. However, such models involve 
important identification issues. In particular, in order to identify the participation decision from the level 
decision it is necessary that we can identify an exogenous variable(s) which affects the decision of whether or 
not to remit but does not affect the decision of how much to remit. The availability of valid exogenous variables 
permits the hypothesis of independence of the disturbances in Equations (2) and (3) to be tested directly and 
corrects for any selection bias arising from correlation between the two disturbances. We identify the exogenous 
variables in frequency of contact with the household members while abroad and form of migration. In fact, the 
relation with the home country, through phone, letters and/or visits strengths the attachment to the home country 
and keeps migrants involved in the life of those left behind. Bettin et al. (2012) use distance between home and 
host country as a proxy for migrant relation with the home country: being more far away increases the cost of 
visiting and spending some time at home (circular migration) as well as reducing the frequency of contacts due 
also to different time zones. The MIREM dataset allows us to use direct measures of migrantÕs relation with the 
home country. Intuitively, the probability of sending remittances decreases as the contacts and visits to the home 
country decrease while the amount of remittances is likely to be influenced by factors related to individual and 
household characteristics, labour supply and consumption. We utilise our exogenous variables as exclusion 
restrictions to test formally between the two-part and Heckman alternatives. Table A2 shows no evidence of 
selectivity bias: the Mills ratio calculated from the first step equation is insignificant in the second step equation. 
Moreover, the two exclusion restrictions, frequency of contact with the household members while abroad and 
form of migration, were added as covariates in equation (3) and as expected they appear to be insignificant in 
explaining the amount of remittances sent to the home country. We conclude the two-part model to be the 
appropriate empirical framework to study remittance behaviour using the MIREM data. For conciseness, the 
results presented in Table A2 are excluded from the discussion in this section.  
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from the host country, there are some factors related to the home country that make Algerians 
behave differently from those from the other two countries.28 Moreover, those coming from a 
rural area are more likely to remit.  
Although we do not have any information on the income and earnings levels of our 
migrants before and during migration, we do consider subjective personal evaluations 
regarding the financial situation before and during migration.29 We find a negative impact on 
both the probability and level of remittances where migrants report non-improvement to their 
financial situation in the host country. Illegal status  has no effect on the probability to remit 
but has a strong positive effect on the level of remittances. Illegal migrants remit as a form of 
insurance against the uncertainty attached to their legal status (see Piracha and Zhu, 2012). 
Under uncertain migration conditions individuals remit a greater fraction of their earnings. 
The insurance hypothesis is strongly supported by our findings: illegal migrants remit 68 
percentage points more than those who enter the host country under legal conditions. 
Notably, time spent abroad has a very small, albeit non-linear, effect on the probability to 
remit. 
Surprisingly, the intended form of migration (temporary vs. permanent) has no effect 
on remittance behaviour. This could reflect the uncertainly at the time of migration decision 
or alternatively intentions might change while in the host country. By contrast, reasons for 
migration do impact strongly on remittance behaviour, particulary  the probability to remit. 
Those who migrate for work (better employment/ better salary/better work conditions) or to 
improve life conditions have a higher probability of remitting.  
Family ties are considered to play a positive and significant role in explaining the 
decision to remit (Bettin et al., 2012). In line with this argument, we find that keeping links 
through letters, e-mails and phone calls with the family members left behind impacts 
positively on the probability to remit. Strong relations with the home country are also  kept 
by circular migrants;  the probability of remittances increases with the number of exits 
(migrants who move frequently between origin and host countries). 
Educational attainment and type of occupation in the host country affect only the 
probability of remittances. The probability of remitting decreases with the educational 
attainment of the migrants. The argument generally put forward for this result is that skilled 
migrants tend to stay in the host country relatively longer-term and have a high probability of 
                                                
28 For example, Algeria is wealthier than Morocco and Tunisia and this may lead to a less incentive to remit.  
29 The use of subjective variables may lead to some criticisms but, as Miotti et al. (2010) argue, individuals 
should be in a better position to evaluate their financial situation. The migrantÕs perception of the income level 
before departure can help understand their remittance behaviour. 
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settling in the host country with their family (see Faini, 2006). Since our analysis is based on 
return migrants only, a better explanation for this observed negative effect of education on 
the decision to remit might be that better educated migrants may enjoy more favourable 
conditions in the home country, thus reducing the need for remittances. The better educated 
may also be affected less by social pressure to remit (Dustmann and Mestres, 2010). 
Interestingly, we do not find any impact for the duration of migration on the probability to 
remit. A possible explanation may be that the effects of duration are mitigated by the 
temporary aspect of return migration. 
Looking at the effect of migrantsÕ labour force status on the probability to remit, we 
find that wage earners and the self-employed are more likely to remit than individuals who 
are not in the labour force (students, housewives and retired). Although we do not observe 
migrants earnings or incomes, we may suppose that migrants with higher earnings are likely 
to remit more. It is also reasonable to consider the self-employed and wage earners to have 
higher incomes than inactive or unemployed migrants who may draw from past accumulated 
savings or some form of part-time earnings. Our finding is in line with Mahuteau et al. (2010) 
who find that being self-employed or a wage earner positively affects the probability of 
remitting. 
Finally, because of lack of information on the earnings in the host country, we use the 
migrant perception of his financial situation abroad. Not surprisingly, our results show that 
for those who did not experience any change in their financial situation after moving abroad 
remitted a lower amount than the ones who reported better financial circumstances.  
 
5.2 Remittance behaviour by type of return   
The type of return (decided or compelled) is considered important in understanding 
and identifying the patterns of reintegration in the origin country (Cassarino, 2008). 30 In our 
selected sample, 644 migrants report that they decided/chose to return home while the 
remaining 201 were compelled to do so. The compelled returnees include a heterogeneous 
group of individuals who, for different circumstances, were forced to interrupt their migration 
experience. The majority of them returned home because they were expelled or their visa in 
the host country expired (about 45 per cent). Some other needed to leave the host country 
                                                
30 ÒDecided or chosen return refers to a migrant who decides on his own initiative to go back to the country of 
origin, without any form of pressure or coercion whatsoever. Decided return is based on the free will of the 
migrant to returnÓ (Cassarino, 2008). Compelled or forced return, however, refers to a condition when a migrant 
returns to his country of origin Òas a result of unfavourable circumstances and factors which abruptly interrupt 
the migration cycleÓ (Cassarino, 2008). In particular, forced return is the result of restrictive and selective 
immigration policies in the destination country  
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because of fiscal/administrative problems (14 per cent). Serious health problems and loss of 
job are among other circumstances which forced the migrant to return home. Instead, 
retirement, homesickness and creation of a project are the main reasons to return home for the 
decided returnees. Family reasons are causes of return for both groups.  
 In order to further explore the profile of the two types of returnees, Table 6 reports 
descriptive statistics by type of return alongside  a z-test to investigate whether differences 
exist between them. The reported p-values indicate that the null hypothesis of equal means 
between decided versus compelled returnees is rejected for certain characteristics that help 
explain the remittance behaviour. In particular, differences exist in terms of return age, level 
of education, duration of the migration experience as well as the occupational status between 
the two groups of return migrants. For example, on average the age of return (32 years) of the 
compelled returnees is less than the ones who decided to return (44 years) as well as the 
average duration of the migration experience (8.4 years for the compelled returnees vs. 18 
years for those who decided to return). Moreover, those who decided to return had chosen 
France as the preferred destination while Italy and ÔOther south EUÕ country seem to have 
been preferred by those who were compelled to return. Finally, we investigate if these 
differences are relevant in the case of remittance behaviour, and perform a Wald test to 
identify whether the coefficients estimated for those who decide to return are equal to the 
coefficients estimated for those who were compelled to return. The test does not reject the 
null hypothesis of equality across the two groups. 
Neverthess we consider it informative to present participation and level of remittances 
by type of return (see Table 7). Marital status, independently of the timing of marriage Ð 
before or during the migration experience Ðpositively affects the amount remitted by the 
compelled returnees. However, for those who decided to return, marital status has no impact 
on remittances though the presence of children in the household before migration affects 
positively the probability to remit. This could possibly be due to the fact that the compelled 
sample is younger, and therefore have a lower probability of having children, or it could 
simply reflect a lack of statistical power due to the small sample of compelled returnees.  
Given that forced returnees have a higher probability to be illegal migrants, we expect 
a stronger impact of illegal  entry in the host country on remittances behaviour when the 
return is compelled. Illegal entry is found to be positive for both types of returnees while the 
effect on the probability to remit is significant only for the decided returnees. One 
explanation maybe that those who decided to return home were more aware of the risk of 
their illegal status resulting in positive effects on the intensive and extensive margins of 
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remittances. By contrast illegal status has no impact for compelled returnees who had initially 
planned to remain in the host country for longer. Interestingly, the intended form of migration 
is an important determinant of the probability of sending remittances when the analysis is 
conducted by type of return. On the one hand, the initial intention of moving permanently 
affects negatively the probability of remitting for the decided returnees: their plan of 
settlement in the host country discourages remittances. On the other hand, the opposite effect 
is found in the case of compelled returnees. It is possible to think that those planning to settle 
in the host country permanently might have been aware of the difficulties of realizing their 
expectation (for example, because they were illegal migrants) and therefore identified 
remittances as their ÒinsuranceÓ in case of failure of their initial plan. 
Finally, the reasons for migration, level of education and labour force status affect the 
probability of remitting only in the case of decided returnees. Absence of statistical 
significance of these effects for the compelled retrurnees maybe explained by the illegal 
status which characterizes the majority of them.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the determinants of remittances by migrants from 
the Maghreb region, namely Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The data used in our analysis is 
drawn from the MIREM project, which captures different migratory stages, i.e., pre-
migration conditions in the country of origin; migrant experiences in the host country; and 
their circumstances in the home country after return.  
A key feature of our data is that it provides information on those who decided to 
return to their country of origin as well as those who were compelled by circumstances 
(perhaps for being illegal). To our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyses the 
remittance behaviour by type of return, albeit with some limitation (e.g. there is insufficient 
information to identify selection into either of these categories).  
We utilise a two-part model to explore the intensive and extensive margins of the 
decision to remit. We identify the intended form of migration, i.e., temporary  or permanent, 
and also distinguish between migrants who chose to return home and those who were 
compelled or forced to return. We find no effect in relation to the intended form of migration 
on either the probability or level of remittances for the pooled sample. However, when we 
split the sample between decided and compelled returnees, we identify opposite and 
statistically significant effects between each group. A negative effect on the probability of 
remitting is found for those who intended to migrate permanently but who decided to return 
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of their own volition. By contrast, those who intended to migrate permanently but were 
compelled to return have a higher probability of remitting. No effect is found regarding the 
level of remittances in either instance. 
Lack of relevant information in the data did not allow us to properly explore the 
distinction between the remittance behaviour of decided and compelled returnees. We 
consider this distintion an important avenue for future research that could provide new 
insights into how people make their remittance choices while abroad. Varying degrees of 
willingness to return, as well as the capacity to mobilize resources to the origin countries, are 
key elements in understanding the potential contribution of return migrants to the economic 
development of sending countries. For those who choose to return to their country of origin, 
the migration experience may represent a calculated strategy defined by the migrants and 
their families (e.g., overcoming credit constraints). Under this assumption, return is part of 
the migration cycle and occurs after the migrants have achieved their objectives in terms of 
acquiring human and financial capital (remittances and/or savings) in the destination country. 
In this context, remittances may reflect a willingness to invest in capital projects and related 
activities upon return.  
The story is different in the case of compelled returnees. Given that those who are 
compelled to return are more frequently illegal migrants, the remittances sent may reflect an 
insurance meahnasim that mitigates failure of the migration experience. Alternatively, it 
could be driven by altruism towards family members. Richer data would allow further 
investigation of remittance motives of this group of migrants.  
The illegal status is an important determinant of the remittance behaviour for the two 
types of returnees. It is plausible to assume that illegal migrants do not use formal channels to 
send transfers, such as banks or credit unions, but rely on informal channels which make 
remittances more difficult to be tracked. Identifying the channels by which remittances flow 
could lead to better understanding of net income transfers and facilitate stronger cooperation 
between origin and destination countries in terms of migration management.  
Of course, the ability of returnees to invest in the home country and contribute to its 
development depends also on the conditions of return. This highlights the importance of 
programmes to support the reintegration process of return migrants in the home country not 
only through simplified administrative procedures but also through programmes and facilities 
in the business sector that help overcome lack of information as well as constraints on 
entrepreneurship opportunities. Even if the proportion of migrants that return home is quite 
small, evidence shows that return migrants are more likely to be engaged in entrepreneurial 
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activities than those who didnÕt migrate and therefore their contribution towards promoting 
development can be quite pronounced (Demurger and Xu, 2011; Piracha and Vadean, 2010). 
Finally, remittances are not solely a monetary phenomenon but could also entail 
social, political and cultural elements. These include ideas, values, practices and codes of 
behaviour which have a long-lasting effect both sending and destination countries. The 
importance of the destination country is crucial as it determines the content of social 
remittances: models of lifestyle, wealth, human capital investments etc. Given that France 
and Italy are the main destination countries of migrants from the Maghreb region, it is 
expected that host countriesÕ cultural traits are transmitted to the origin countries. It is 
difficult to quantify these forms of transfer (see Anghel et al 2016 for a review of the 
literature) but it is not in doubt that social remittances link society of origin and destination 
countries, and that the intensity of this link could be stronger in the case of migrants who 
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Figure 1 – Period abroad by origin country and last level of education 
 
 
Figure 2. Composition of the labour force status
 
 
Figure 3.  Last activity in the host country by origin country 
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Graphs by origin country
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Table 1.  Geographical stratification 
     
Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Wilayas n % Regions n % Governorates n % 
Algiers 104 31,3 Tadla-Azilal 111 33,6 Tunis 122 37 
Setif 82 24,7 Casablanca 99 30 Ariana 40 12,1 
Bejaia 75 22,6 Chaouia-Ourdigha 57 17,3 Sfax 40 12,1 
Tlemcen 71 21,4 Rabat-Salè- 
50 15,2 
Sousse 40 12,1 
      Zemmour-Zaër Nabeul 28 8,5 
      Other regions 13 3,9 Medenine 25 7,6 
            Mahdia 20 6,1 
            La Manouba 15 4,5 






                
 
Table 2. Remittance frequency 
      
 
Algeria Morocco Tunisia All 
 Frequency of sending 
remittances   n % n % n % n % 
Every month 13 4,29 55 26,07 85 31,37 153 19,49 
Every three months 34 11,22 37 17,54 56 20,66 127 16,18 
Every six months 37 12,21 13 6,16 6 2,21 56 7,13 
Every year 49 16,17 23 11 5 1,85 77 9,81 
Occasionally 38 10,56 37 17,54 59 21,77 128 16,31 
Never   138 45,54 46 21,8 60 22,14 244 31,08 
Total   303 38,6 211 26,88 271 34,52 785 100 
 
 
Table 3. Remittance amount per year 
          
Country sending nothing Less than €200 €200 - €500 €501-€1000 
More than 
€1000 
  n % n % n % n % n % 
Algeria 138 45,54 23 7,59 43 14,19 35 11,55 64 21,12 
Morocco 46 21,8 28 13,27 46 21,8 38 18,01 53 25,12 
Tunisia 60 22,14 33 12,18 73 26,94 35 12,92 70 25,83 















Table 4.  Descriptive statistics 

















































Living in a rural location before migration 0.310    
(0.463) 
0.257    
(0.438) 
0.224    
(0.418) 
0.266     
(0.442) 
Financial situation before migration: good 0.188    
(0.391) 
0.177    
(0.382) 
0.159    
(0.366) 
0.175    
(0.380) 


























Contact with the HH at home: 
never/occasionally 
0.172    
(0.378) 
0.067    
(0.251) 
0.103    
(0.305) 
0.119   
(0.324) 




























































Intention of permanent migration 0.313 0.312 0.208 0.277 
 (0.465) (0.464) (0.406) (0.448) 
Destination country: France 
 
0.752    
(0.432) 
0.286    
(0.453) 
0.487    
(0.500) 
0.531    
(0.499) 








































education before return: no educ 
 
(0.266)    
(0.442) 
(0.130)     
(0.337) 
0.121   
 (0.326) 
0.178    
(0.383) 
























Last LF status overseas: Inactive 
 
0.197  
  (0.398) 
0.063    
 (0.244) 
0.131    
(0.338) 
0.137    
(0.344) 




















































0.425    
(0.495)   
0.326    
(0.469) 
N 319 237 289 845 
*This category includes those who were married and did not change their status while abroad.
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Table 5. Two-Part Model 
VARIABLES Participation Level 




Origin Country (Ref. Algeria)   
Morocco 0.191*** -0.283* 
 (0.039) (0.166) 
Tunisia 0.188*** -0.180 
 (0.038) (0.143) 
Female 0.010 -0.419* 
 (0.059) (0.224) 
Married before migration -0.128* 0.433** 
 (0.069) (0.196) 
Married abroad -0.062 0.198 
 (0.046) (0.135) 
HH size before migration 0.007 0.025 
 (0.005) (0.017) 
Having children before migration 0.139*** -0.299 
 (0.050) (0.186) 
HH size abroad -0.008 -0.090*** 
 (0.007) (0.023) 
Living in a rural location before migration 0.154*** -0.055 
 (0.037) (0.118) 
Illegally status 0.058 0.681*** 
 (0.057) (0.162) 
Contact with the HH at home: (ref. never/ occasionally)    
At least once a year 0.167***  
 (0.041)  
At least once a month 0.272***  
 (0.042)  
Every week 0.275***  
 (0.050)  
   
Migrate for improve life conditions 0.176*** 0.199 
 (0.053) (0.229) 
Migrate for work 0.188*** 0.258 
 (0.052) (0.229) 
Intention of permanent migration -0.035 -0.010 
 (0.040) (0.116) 
Education before return (ref. No education)   
Primary -0.127 -0.171 
 (0.085) (0.170) 
Secondary -0.304*** -0.001 
 (0.087) (0.190) 
Tertiary -0.329*** -0.002 
 (0.097) (0.225) 
Last LF status overseas (ref. Inactive)   
Unemployed 0.103* -0.363 
 (0.061) (0.334) 
Wage earner 0.245*** 0.0188 
 (0.061) (0.195) 
Self employed 0.192*** -0.042 
 (0.041) (0.223) 
No. of years abroad 0.009* 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.016) 
No. of years abroad squared -0.0001* 6.99e-05 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Financial situation abroad has not improved -0.279*** -0.310* 
 (0.059) (0.182) 
No. of exits 0.0719*  
 (0.039)  
Constant  6.647*** 
  (0.497) 
lnsigma  0.065 
  (0.048) 
Log-likelihood -344.694 -750.790 
F-test 1stage 35.11  
P-value joint 0.000***  
Observations 845 587 
Notes: We control for the countries of destination, financial situation before migration and the reasons for migration (education, to join the 
family etc). Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics by type of return 
Variables Decided Compelled p-value 
Sending remittances 0.698 0.681 0.645 
Age of return 44.879 32.974 0.000*** 
Female 0.113 0.119 0.814 
Algeria 0.395 0.318 0.047 
Morocco 0.245 0.393 0.000*** 
Tunisia 0.358 0.288 0.067 
Married before migration 0.312 0.213 0.007 
Married while abroad 0.363 0.189 0.000*** 
HH size before migration 6.636 6.990 0.156 
Having children before migration 0.265 0.134 0.000*** 
HH size abroad 3.355 3.572 0.231 
Rural location before migration 0.885 0.308 0.000*** 
Financial situation before migration: good 0.181 0.154 0.372 
Financial situation before migration: satisfactory 0.436 0.462 0.512 
Financial situation before migration: bad 0.381 0.383 0.977 
Enter illegally 0.088 0.308 0.000*** 
Contact with the HH at home: never/occasionally 0.118 0.124 0.808 
Contact with the HH at home: at least once a year 0.077 0.039 0.064 
Contact with the HH at home: at least once a month 0.350 0.358 0.850 
Contact with the HH at home: every week 0.453 0.477 0.548 
Reason for migration: study 0.169 0.144 0.403 
Reason for migration: join the family 0.082 0.099 0.449 
Reason for migration: improve life conditions 0.336 0.363 0.494 
Reason for migration: work 0.335 0.333 0.956 
Intended to migrate abroad permanently 0.233 0.418 0.000*** 
Destination country: France 0.583 0.363 0.000*** 
Destination country: Italy 0.147 0.338 0.000*** 
Destination country: other south EU  0.021 0.094 0.000*** 
Destination country: other EU  0.094 0.099 0.840 
Destination country: MENA Region 0.962 0.079 0.476 
Destination country: rest of the World 0.055 0.024 0.074 
Final education before return: no educ 0.222 0.039 0.000*** 
Final education before return: primary 0.170 0.169 0.956 
Final education before return: secondary 0.017 0.035 0.000*** 
Final education before return: tertiary 0.322 0.283 0.293 
Last LF status overseas: Inactive 0.153 0.084 0.012** 
Last LF status overseas: Unemployed 0.027 0.134 0.000*** 
Last LF status overseas: Wage earner 0.658 0.582 0.049* 
Last LF status overseas: Self employed 0.159 0.199 0.197 
No. of years abroad 18.486 8.333 0.000*** 
Financial situation abroad has not improved 0.142 0.253 0.000*** 
No. of exits 0.173 0.233 0.057* 
Invest in a project upon return 0.357 0.228 0.000*** 
N 644 201  
  





















Table 7. Two-Part Model by type of return 
 Decided Compelled 
VARIABLES Participation Level Participation Level 
Origin Country (Ref. Algeria)     
Morocco 0.194*** -0.166 0.209** -0.852** 
 (0.040) (0.186) (0.092) (0.362) 
Tunisia 0.191*** -0.172 0.249*** -0.756** 
 (0.042) (0.159) (0.071) (0.349) 
Female -0.020 -0.392 0.012 -0.638 
 (0.068) (0.252) (0.114) (0.473) 
Married before migration -0.094 0.306 -0.336* 0.851** 
 (0.077) (0.219) (0.182) (0.420) 
Married abroad -0.059 -0.091 -0.072 1.207*** 
 (0.051) (0.155) (0.120) (0.311) 
HH size before migration 0.008 0.023 -0.009 0.023 
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.011) (0.036) 
Having children before migration 0.135** -0.298 0.125 -0.652 
 (0.056) (0.206) (0.089) (0.442) 
HH size abroad -0.012 -0.101*** 0.009 -0.079* 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.015) (0.040) 
Living in a rural location before migration 0.163*** -0.025 0.172*** -0.047 
 (0.042) (0.131) (0.060) (0.269) 
Enter illegally 0.171*** 0.771*** -0.083 0.756** 
 (0.043) (0.195) (0.123) (0.313) 
Contact with the HH at home: (ref. never/ 
occasionally)  
0.194*** -0.166 0.209** -0.852** 
At least once a year 0.172***  0.171***  
 (0.040)  (0.045)  
At least once a month 0.226***  0.450***  
 (0.050)  (0.090)  
every week 0.228***  0.565***  
 (0.059)  (0.109)  
Migrate for improve life conditions 0.194*** 0.249 0.0202 0.269 
 (0.055) (0.259) (0.160) (0.477) 
Migrate for work 0.244*** 0.404 -0.0881 0.099 
 (0.052) (0.258) (0.177) (0.497) 
Intention of permanent migration -0.124** 0.0125 0.157** -0.015 
 (0.052) (0.139) (0.0714) (0.228) 
Education before return (ref. No education)     
Primary -0.123 0.004 -0.217 -0.504 
 (0.088) (0.178) (0.377) (0.595) 
Secondary -0.306*** 0.0816 -0.406* 0.274 
 (0.103) (0.212) (0.240) (0.598) 
Tertiary -0.326*** 0.206 -0.485 -0.362 
 (0.109) (0.249) (0.351) (0.665) 
Last LF status overseas (ref. Inactive)     
Unemployed 0.170*** -0.655 -0.097 0.783 
 (0.041) (0.453) (0.201) (0.703) 
Wage earner 0.311*** -0.167 -0.052 1.119* 
 (0.071) (0.208) (0.133) (0.625) 
Self employed 0.175*** -0.242 0.131 1.222* 
 (0.045) (0.246) (0.108) (0.660) 
No. of years abroad 0.006 0.0217 0.050*** -0.094 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.016) (0.061) 
No. of years abroad squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.001*** 0.003* 
 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.002) 
Financial situation abroad has not improved  -0.281*** -0.247 -0.346*** -0.444 
 (0.077) (0.226) (0.117) (0.306) 
No. of exits 0.025  0.167***  
 (0.048)  (0.057)  
Constant  6.531***  6.275*** 
  (0.551)  (1.218) 
lnsigma  0.031  -0.017 
  (0.054)  (0.101) 
Log-likelihood -243.346 -567.301 -67.955 -162.21 
F-test 1 stage 17.05  21.34  
P-value joint  0.001  0.000  
Observations 644 450 201 137 
Notes: We control for the countries of destination, financial situation before migration and the reasons for migration 





Table A1. Probability and level of remittances as simultaneous decision 
VARIABLES Interval regression Ordered probit 
   
Female -0.441* -0.164 
 (0.249) (0.159) 
Married before migration 0.136 -0.022 
 (0.227) (0.151) 
Married abroad 0.093 0.015 
 (0.158) (0.106) 
HH size before migration 0.039* 0.0279** 
 (0.020) (0.013) 
Having children before migration 0.017 0.128 
 (0.221) (0.147) 
HH size abroad -0.100*** -0.057*** 
 (0.028) (0.018) 
Living in a rural location before migration 0.220 0.191* 
 (0.149) (0.100) 
Enter illegally 0.772*** 0.474*** 
 (0.200) (0.135) 
Contact with the HH at home: (ref. never/ occasionally)    
At least once a year 0.329 0.318 
 (0.294) (0.195) 
At least once a month 0.551** 0.486*** 
 (0.214) (0.141) 
Every week 0.727*** 0.544*** 
 (0.216) (0.142) 
Migrate for improve life conditions 0.563** 0.474*** 
 (0.247) (0.167) 
Migrate for work 0.607** 0.530*** 
 (0.248) (0.168) 
Intention of permanent migration -0.063 -0.029 
 (0.136) (0.091) 
Education before return (ref. No education)   
primary -0.366* -0.266* 
 (0.214) (0.144) 
secondary -0.350 -0.324** 
 (0.238) (0.159) 
tertiary -0.395 -0.344* 
 (0.274) (0.182) 
Last LF status overseas (ref. Inactive)   
Unemployed  0.008 0.178 
 (0.359) (0.226) 
Wage earner 0.654*** 0.505*** 
 (0.211) (0.138) 
Self-employed 0.607** 0.474*** 
 (0.251) (0.166) 
No. of years abroad 0.028 0.019 
 (0.018) (0.012) 
No. of years abroad squared -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Financial situation abroad has not improved -0.865*** -0.680*** 
 (0.193) (0.125) 
No. of exits 0.0071 0.069 
 (0.151) (0.101) 
Cut1 Constant 4.346*** 0.663* 
 (0.580) (0.382) 
Cat2 Constant  1.053*** 
  (0.383) 
Cat3 Constant  1.714*** 
  (0.384) 
cut4 Constant  2.170*** 
  (0.385) 
lnsigma 0.362***  
 (0.0498)  
Log-likelihood -972.947 -1147.825 
Observations 845 845 
Notes: We control for the countries of origin and destination, financial situation before migration and reason for migration (education, to 




   Table A2. Heckman sample selection model 
VARIABLES Participation Level 




Origin Country (Ref. Algeria)   
Morocco 0.191*** -0.242 
 (0.039) (0.203) 
Tunisia 0.188*** -0.138 
 (0.037) (0.178) 
Female 0.010 -0.424* 
 (0.059) (0.224) 
Married before migration -0.128* 0.409* 
 (0.069) (0.210) 
Married abroad -0.061 0.190 
 (0.046) (0.135) 
HH size before migration 0.007 0.026 
 (0.005) (0.016) 
Having children before migration 0.138*** -0.270 
 (0.050) (0.181) 
HH size abroad -0.008 -0.091*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) 
Living in a rural location before migration 0.154*** -0.030 
 (0.037) (0.138) 
Enter illegally 0.058 0.691*** 
 (0.057) (0.163) 
Contact with the HH at home: (ref. never/ occasionally)    
At least once a year 0.167***  
 (0.042)  
At least once a month 0.271***  
 (0.042)  
Every week 0.274***  
 (0.050)  
Intention of permanent migration -0.035 -0.015 
 (0.040) (0.899) 
Education before return (ref. No education)   
Primary -0.127 -0.179 
 (0.085) (0.170) 
Secondary -0.304*** -0.021 
 (0.087) (0.194) 
Tertiary -0.329*** -0.029 
 (0.097) (0.232) 
Last LF status overseas (ref. Inactive)   
Unemployed 0.102* -0.350 
 (0.061) (0.335) 
Wage earner 0.244*** 0.061 
 (0.061) (0.216) 
Self employed 0.200*** -0.010 
 (0.041) (0.234) 
No. of years abroad 0.009* 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.016) 
No. of years abroad squared -0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial situation abroad has not improved -0.278*** -0.361 
 (0.059) (0.216) 
No. of exits 0.071*  
 (0.039)  
Inverse mills ratio  0.142 
  (0.344) 
Constant  6.483*** 
  (0.616) 
lnsigma  0.065 
  (0.048) 
Log-likelihood -344.694 -750.690 
Observations 845 587 
Notes: We control for the countries of destination, financial situation before migration and reasons for migration. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500 repetitions used to estimate level of remittances). Standard errors in parenthesis:  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
